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Aristotle's Elegiacs to Eudemus
(Fr. 673 Rose^ = Olymp. in PL Gorg. Comm.
p. 214. 25 ff. Westerink)
R. RENEHAN
oxi 5£ Kal 'ApiaxoT£XT|(; aePei avxov ©q 6i5daKaXov, 8fiX,6q eoxv
Ypdya^ oXov Xoyov eyKco^iaoxiKov • eKxlGexai ydp xov piov
av)xoij KOI •uJCEpenaivev- oi) }j.6vov 5e eyKconiov noiriaaq avxov
EJiaivei a\)x6v, aXkb. koi ev xoiq zXtytioxq xoiq Tcpoq EvSrmov
avxov enaivmv nXxxxcova eyKconid^ev ypdcpcov ovxocx;-
eXBtov 5' kc, kXeivov KcKponiTiq SdneSov
£\)O£Pe(0(; oEiivfiq ^iXiTiq l6pijaaxo P(0|i6v
dv5p6(; ov o\)5' aiveiv xoiai KaKoiai Geniq-
oq iiovoq ti TrpoJxoq Svtixojv koxeSei^ev £vapY(b(;
oiKEicp XE Pio) Kal )j.e965oioi Xoycov, 5
(HQ, dyaBoq xe koI E\)5ai|i(ov d^a yivExai dvrip-
OV) vuv 5' Eoxi XoPeiv ovSevi xauxd koxe.
V. 2 I5pvoaxo] i6p-uoao Bergk II v. 6 malim yiyvExai, ut persuasum
habeo Aristotelem sic scripsisse II v. 7 verba saepe in dubium vocata,
varie tentata; haec exempli causa adfero: ox> vvv] xwv vvv Bergk,
ov)KO\)v Geffcken I oxt vvv 5' eoxi] vtiv 5' ovk eoxi Wil. I Xa^tiv
o\)5evi] XoGevv ot)5£va Rose I xavxd jioxe] xavx' txTiopov Theiler
That these verses are genuine is not in doubt, their meaning is. Much of
the difficulty is directly traceable to the two facts that (1) the poem itself is
incomplete and (2) the time and circumstances of its composition are
uncertain. It is essential to keep these unfortunate gaps in our knowledge
ever present in attempting to interpret the verses; more than one scholar
who has tried his hand at this has put forward unproven assertions as if they
were undoubted matters of historical record.
The number of problems which these few verses raise is remarkable; for
convenience I list the main difficulties: (1) Olympiodorus cites these verses
from xa eXeyeia xa 7ip6(; E\S6rmov. Which Eudemus is intended? (2)
Who set up the altar mentioned in verse 2? (3) Is the dvTip of verse 3
Socrates or Plato? (4) Was the altar set up in honor of the goddess
Friendship (<^iXia) or of the man mentioned in verse 3? If the latter, does
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this imply deification? (5) Who are the KaKoi mentioned in verse 3? (6)
What is the meaning of verse 7? To these difficulties I would add a seventh,
hitherto ignored: What is the meaning of the Greek in verse 3, ov oijS'
aiveiv xoioi KaKoioi Geixiq?
Of the numerous discussions of this poem the most important are those
of Wilamowitz* and of Jaeger.^ Konrad Gaiser's useful study, "Die Elegie
des Aristoteles an Eudemos," in Mus. Helv. 23 (1966) 84-106, provides a
very full bibliography; for further details the reader should consult this
paper.
There are two presumptive candidates to be the Eudemus of Aristotle's
poem, (1) Eudemus of Cyprus, a fellow Platonist of Aristotle's who died in
battle at Syracuse, probably either in the year 354 or in 353,^ and in
memory of whom Aristotle composed his dialogue Eudemus, and (2)
Eudemus of Rhodes, a well-known student of Aristotle's. Both men have
found their supporters. For instance, Wilamowitz and Gaiser (for very
different reasons) favor the Cyprian, Jaeger and During the Rhodian. At first
sight Eudemus of Cyprus seems an attractive choice; what more natural than
that Aristotle should address a poem on friendship to the friend whose death
so moved him that he named a dialogue after him? "Sehr viel ansprechender
[sc. than that the poem is addressed to Eudemus of Rhodes] ist dagegen, dass
der Unbenannte, dem das Gedicht gait, der Kyprier Eudemos war, und dass
das Gedicht durch die Freundschaft zu diesem dem Aristoteles entlockt ist,
ganz wie der Dialog seines Namens," wrote Wilamowitz^ who dated the
poem to before the year 357. But there are difficulties: "The traditional text
is ev xoi(; iXzydoic; xoic, npbq E\S5t||iov. That is to say, a living Eudemus
The following abbreviations are used in this article:
During' I. During, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition
(Goteborg 1957)
Diiring^ I. Diiring, review of Vita Aristotelis Marciana, ed. O. Gigon,
Gnomon 35 (1963) 342^6
Diiring^ I. During, Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines
Denkens (Heidelberg 1966)
Gaiser K. Gaiser, "Die Elegie des Aristoteles an Eudemus," Mus. Helv.
23 (1966) 84-106
Immisch O. Immisch, "Ein Gedicht des Aristoteles." Philol. 65 (1906) 1-
23
Jaeger* W. Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his
Development^. Translated with the Author's Corrections and
Additions by Richard Robinson (Oxford 1948)
Jaeger^ W. Jaeger, "AristoUe's Verses in Praise of Plato." CQ 21 (1927)
13-17 = Scripta Minora I (Rome 1960) 339-45
Wil.* U. von Wilamowilz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen II
(Berlin 1893)
Wil.2 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Platon l^ (BerUn 1959)
»Wil.i 412-16.
^Jaeger' 106-10 and Jaeger^.
' Gaiser 102 n. 62.
"Wil.' 413.
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is addressed. This can be none other than Eudemus of Rhodes, the pupil of
Aristotle. The poem, I take it, is composed after the death of Plato; and this
Eudemus is appropriately addressed in a poem directed, after a recognized
convention, to an exaipoc; for his enlightenment." So pronounced Jaeger,^
and Greek usage favors his position. His point is that npoq EiSStmov is
normal Greek when someone is being directly addressed (and therefore alive);
the Greek for "in honor of Eudemus" would be ei<; E\S5ti(iov and that is not
what Olympiodorus wrote.^ Moreover, KaxeSei^ev . . . oikeico pCo) (vv.
4-5) clearly suggests that the ^ioc, in question is over (otherwise one might
expect a present tense) and the emphatically contrasting ov vt)v in verse 7
leaves no doubt that such is the case. Furthermore, KaxaSeiicvD^i was
often applied, as Jaeger pointed out, "in a pregnant sense to religious
revelation."^ Such is surely its force here. Now it has not been observed
that these verbs, when so used, almost invariably occur in the aorist, as
here, and refer to a time now past. For examples see N. J. Richardson's
note to the Horn. Hymn to Demeter AlA-16 and my Greek Lexicographical
Notes, vols. I and II s.v. KaxaSedcvuixi.* Plato, who is referred to here (as
all now agree: see below), died some six or seven years after Eudemus the
Cyprian, so that it follows that this latter individual cannot be directly
addressed in this poem, which is what the Tipoq in the expression ev xolc,
eXeyeCok; Toiq npoq E-uStdxov would unambiguously require. As noted
above, the Greek for "in honor of Eudemus," not necessarily implying direct
address, is Eiq E\36Tmov, and that is what we actually find in Plutarch, when
he refers to the dialogue Eudemus, written after the death of Eudemus the
Cyprian: . . . o xe K-oTipioq E\55Ti)i.o(;, z\c, ov 'ApiaxoxEXriq ocTioBavovxa
xov TiEpl v|/-uxfi<; 6idXo7ov etioitioe {Dion 22. 5 = Eudemus fr. 1 Ross^who
translates, "... Eudemus the Cyprian, to whom after his death Aristotle
dedicated his dialogue On Soul . . ."). Note that Plutarch makes no
mention of the Elegy to Eudemus here. Has no one observed that this is a
minor argumentum e silentio against the identification of the Cyprian
Eudemus with the addressee of the poem? If Aristotle had composed the
^Jaeger^ 14 = 340-41.
^ I caution the inexperienced against assuming that such fine distinctions are artificial
or imaginary; they are in fact very real. As good an illustration of this as any is the legal
distinction seen in npoc, c. ace. versus Kaxd c. gen. See Demosthenes' twenty-sixth
oration, the title of which is Ilepl zf\q dxtXtiaq npbc, Aenxwriv {vel sim.). One of the
argumenta prefixed to this speech in the MSS begins '0 Tipoq AentCvTiv Xoyoi;
e7ii7pa<pT)v exei ToiawTTiv, e7tei6fi7tep napeXSovtoq tov xpovo-u ev 9 unevGuvoq rjv
Kpioei Ktti Tin(op{a 7pd<pcov tk; vouov, ecpaivexo AentCvTiq dKiv8\)voq- oGev npoq
awTov, oKX' OV) kut' aiiTow 6 Xoyoq. The distinction enunciated here is no
grammarian's invention but a reflection of actual classical usage: Isaeus 11. 34 ei 6e \ii\xt
npbc, ene (ifite Kat" ejiou 8{ktiv eivai <pTioi t^ nai8i, xov KcoXvovxa vojiov eiJidxco
KxX. For the legalities at issue see W. Wyse's edition of Isaeus (Cambridge 1904) ad loc.
(p. 701) and J. E. Sandys' edition of Demosthenes' Leplines (Cambridge 1890) xxii-xxiii.
' Jaeger^ 16 = 343.
* See also Gaiser 96 n. 41.
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poem for this Eudemus, it would have been entirely appropriate for
Plutarch, who was a man of wide and varied learning, to have mentioned the
fact in this context.
Wilamowitz recognized the difficulty presented by npoc, but could not
explain it.' Years later, he still adhered to his belief in the Cyprian, and
still dated the poem after Eudemus' death despite the npoc,: "... das
Gedicht auf Eudemos von Kypros gemacht war, natiirlich als Totenklage."^^
There is the additional difficulty that a Totenklage for Eudemus, presumably
composed not long after his death in 354/53, would have been written while
Plato was still alive, and that cannot be reconciled with the Greek of verses
4-7. Gaiser returns to the older view (considered, but not favored by
Wilamowitz) that the poem was addressed to Eudemus the Cyprian y^Hle he
was still alive, which would account for the npoc, at least, but his new
interpretation of the meaning of the poem seems completely untenable to
me (see below). On the whole, despite the natural wish to associate the
Eudemus of the poem with the Eudemus of Aristotle's dialogue on the soul,
the position of Jaeger and some others is best supported by the evidence.
Beyond the likelihood that Eudemus of Rhodes is intended by the words
npcx; E\S5ti|iov we know nothing of the external occasion of the poem.
The related question of the identity of the person who dedicated the altar
can be dealt with expeditiously. Wilamowitz seems to have always
remained convinced that Eudemus of Cyprus was the dedicator. Jaeger
described the dedicator of the altar as unknown to us. The Aristotelian vitae
preserve a garbled account which makes Aristotle himself the dedicator.^^ In
modem times Immisch and Diiring have argued for this identification. This
latter scholar is almost dogmatic: "1st wirklich die Elegie so ratselhaft?
Wem ist das Gedicht gewidmet, und wer ist Subjeckt zu l6pt)aaTo? Ich
kann nicht verstehen warum die Antworten, die auf der Hand liegen, nichts
taugen: (1) Eudemos von Rhodos, sein treuer Schiiler, (2) Aristoteles
selbst, der nach langer Abwesenheit nach 'Kekropias heiligem Boden'
zuruckkehrte."^^ To this theory more than one scholar has objected that it is
excluded by the verb in the third person. The objection is serious, but not
decisive. So long as the poem remains fragmentary, and therefore the
context unknown, it remains possible, despite the third-person verb, that the
speaker is in fact Aristotle. It is even possible that the speaker of these
words was not Aristotle himself; he could have put them in the mouth of
another person referring not to himself, but to Aristotle. In sum, with our
present knowledge we cannot answer the question; we just do not know.
Here again Jaeger was correct.
' Wil.* 413: "Dann war es aber nichl an ihn gerichtet, da er in driller Person erwahnl
wird, und Olympiodor halle eiq Ev6tihov sagen soUen. Wenn ich nun auch diese . .
.
Auffassung vorsiehe, so muss ich doch geslehn, dass die Sache keineswegs sicher ist"
1° Wil/ 561 n. 4 (emphasis mine).
^^ For details see Jaeger^ 107 with n. 2 and Gaiser 97-100.
'^ Diiring^ 345; see also During^ 317.
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A far more interesting question is the identity of the dvrip of verse 3:
Socrates or Plato? Bemays and Theodor Gomperz argued for the former. No
one, I think, would agree with them nowadays, and it would be superfluous
to refute anew in any detail. Suffice to point out that Olympiodorus' sole
reason for adducing these verses was to provide evidence that Aristotle was
not hostile to Plato. If the verses referred to Socrates they are pointless in
this context, and surely it is most improbable that Olympiodorus, or rather
his learned source, presumably still with access to the entire poem, was
guilty of such a gross confusion.^ ^ There is no doubt that the reference is to
Plato and the verses do reflect Aristotle's attitude towards Plato. They
constitute a precious human document which strikingly illustrates
Aristotle's veneration for Plato, as Jaeger has eloquently demonstrated.
Scholars in antiquity at times assumed that Aristotle's disagreements with
Plato meant that he must have been his enemy; we know better. Aristotle
himself, practicing what he had learned from Plato, gave beautiful
expression to his own attitude in the famous passage of the Nicomachean
Ethics, 1096all-16 ( . . . Ka{7tep Jtpoadvxo-uc; xfjc; xoia-uxTiq ^TixTjaeox;
YivofXEVTiq 5id TO (piXovc, avdpac, eiaayaYeiv xd el'6T| kxX.).
The poem also contains some slight doxographical clues, both about
Socrates and about Plato, and these have perhaps not been adequately
explored. There is a minor point of grammatical usage which is of interest
because it proves that Aristotle regularly distinguished carefully between (1)
the historical Socrates and (2) the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues. I refer
to the so-called "Fitzgerald's Canon," according to which Aristotle wrote
ZcoKpdxTiq (anarthrous) when he was referring to the Socrates of history and
6 ZooKpdxTiq when he meant the Platonic Socrates of the dialogues.^'* I^ow
in verse 6 of our poem the revelation (Kaxe6ev4ev) is announced: (oc,
dyaGoc; xe Kal e\)5aip.cov djia yivexai dvrip. At first glance the
thought looks "Socratic" and one understands why some scholars wished to
assign it to Socrates. Others, correctly, objected both that Socrates taught
nothing (he certainly never proclaimed a religious "revelation"!) and that this
doctrine is that of the Republic and Gorgias}^ As Jaeger observed, "it is
improbable that the ethical rigorism of the Gorgias and the Republic is
^' For further particulars see Jaeger^ 106 n. 3. I add only that it is inconceivable that
Aristotle could have written (lovoq in v. 4
—
qualified by fi npanoc, or not—of Socrates.
Even a tentative exclusion of Plato's primary claim here on the part of Aristotle would be
psychologically unconvincing. The enormous impact which contact with the living
Socrates had on Plato was not, indeed could not be, experienced by Aristotle. Contrast his
relatively subdued assessment of Socrates at Met. 1078bl7-31.
^* For Fitzgerald's Canon see W. D. Ross' edition of the Metaphysics (Oxford 1924),
vol. I, xxxix-xli; the evidence for the validity of this "rule" (which is actually only a
particular application of the normal use of the definite article) is quite convincing.
'* For references see Gaiser 84 n. 2 (on p. 85). Scholars also rightly refer to the Laws
660e ( . . . ojq 6 (iev aYa06(; avfip oaxppcov civ Kal 8{Kaioq evSaijicov taxi Kal
(laKdpioq) and 742e (axe56v ^ev yap ev8a{n.ovaq ajia Kal ayaSovc; dvayKTi
yiyveaBai).
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substantially Socratic."'^ In verse 4 Aristotle explicitly states npcoxoq
9vT|Ta)v KaxE6ei^£v Evapyox; and, as we have seen, all now agree that the
reference is to Plato. From this we may legitimately draw the inference that
Aristotle did not believe that Socrates had clearly demonstrated both by his
life and by his philosophical teachings that "a man becomes both good and
happy at the same time." Plato was the first to achieve that. Whether
Aristotle felt that Socrates could not make such a claim because of his life's
unhappy end'"' or because of his lack of positive teachings, or both, who can
say? This conclusion is negative; it has a positive counterpart.
That Aristotle had great admiration for (much oO Plato's philoso-
phizing
—
^E0o6oi ^.oycov—is hardly a new discovery. But this poem tells
us explicitly that Aristotle believed Plato to be good (ayaQoc,) and happy
(e\)5ai^a)v) and that he became so not only because of his philosophical
dialectic, but also because of his personal way of life (oikeio) pCw). This is
a precious testimony, of a sort not found in his formal philosophical
treatises, for Aristotle's own opinion of Plato the man, and it is deserving
of comparison with Plato's judgment of Socrates in the Seventh Letter}^ It
merits greater attention than it seems to have received.
Next we consider briefly the meaning of vv. 2-3 (evoePeox; . .
.
dvSpoq). Of these words Wilamowitz once wrote: "Und nun die
Hauptfrage: zxxsz^kdic; oE|ivfi<; (piXiTi(; iSpiSoaTo Pcojiov dv5p6<;
(n^dxcovoq), was heisst das?"*' His answer was that p(0}i6v dvSpoc; go
together and <^\X\.r[c, is a genitive of cause ("der Genitiv ist der des Grundes
. . . zu dem die alten Grammatiker ein Xeitiei ti EVEKa zu bemerken
pflegen"). That is, he took the Greek to mean, as he paraphrased it,
oePo^evoc; t^v oE^ivTiv (piA,{av P(0|x6v i6pt)aaxo IlXxxxcovoq. Wilamowitz
then went on, in eloquent and stirring language, to argue that Aristotle here
represents Plato as a god. Jaeger argued vigorously against this notion of an
apotheosis of Plato, and printed OiXiriq with a capital phi for clarity,
correctly in my view. Wilamowitz's interpretation involves a curious and
compound aberration both of style and sense. Verse two is an integral unit:
'^ Jaeger^ 15 = 342.
'^ One tends to forget that the Greeks did not fully share our romantic view of Socrates'
death. That it was a noble end they understood; that it was a desirable end would have
struck them as paradoxical, not to say quixotic. Aristotle's own views on happiness are
well known from his Ethics; he looked to the end in deciding whether a man was truly
happy. At EN 1101a6-8 he states a0XiO(; jiev o\)8znoxt yivoix' av 6 ev6a{jicov, ov
jifiv jiampioc; ^e, av npiamKaiq vvxaic, nepiTiecrn. However he is not fully consistent
in his views on what the prerequisites for happiness are (W. K. C. Guthrie, History of
Greek Philosophy VI [Cambridge 1981] 342-43, has some good remarks on Aristotle's
inconsistencies in this regard) and, in any event, it is not at all clear to what extent, or
how rigorously, one should apply Aristotle's formal ethical teachings to the interpretation
of this poem.
324 d-€: . . . <p£X,ov avSpa z\io\ 7tpeo(3i>Tepov IcoKpatii, ov eyo) 0%e66v ov>k
av aiaxwoijiTiv einoav SiKaiotatov eivai xcov tote.
1' Wil.i 414.
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evaePeax; aefivfiq ^iXiTjq i6p\)oaTo Paj^ov. What Greek who read thus far
could have failed to join <I)iXiti<; Pcofxov together? If that question, so put,
seem too facile to any, I shall be more specific. In a dedicatory epigram,
real or literary, a certain neatness of diction is expected. For the name of the
recipient of the altar to be postponed to the following verse when there is an
abstract noun capable (1) of being personified as a deity and (2) of being
governed by the word "altar" in that same verse is stylistically intolerable,
and not to be explained away as due to Aristotle's lack of poetic ability
when another explanation is ready to hand. Go now to the third verse.
However one interpret dvSpoq, it is undeniable that the following clause, ov
o\)6' aivEiv loiai KaKoioi Gejiiq, must go closely with it. Take dv6p6(; as
Wilamowitz does and the result is a dedicatory statement of the form "X set
up an altar of the man whom it is right for the wicked not even to praise."
In a dedication one wants a simple genitive of the name, not such a verse as
dv5p6(; . . . Qi\ii<;. Compare Aelian, Var. Hist. 8. 19 = Anaxagoras A 24
D-K: OTi Kttl Pco)j.6(; a\)TW lOTaxai Kal iniyiypanxai ol fiev No\!), oi
6e 'AXrjGelaq.^^ Far smoother stylistically is Jaeger's interpretation: "He
piously set up an altar of holy Friendship / For the man whom it is not
lawful for bad men even to praise."
Not only the style, but also the sense of the verses is most peculiar, if
Aristotle has intended to proclaim the apotheosis of Plato: He introduces
him by the word dv5p6q (v. 3), then seems to reinforce the point in verse 4
(GvTiTcov), and, above all, in verse 6 incorporates dv-qp in the philosophical
truth exemplified by Plato in his own person. Wilamowitz himself seems
later to have quietly dropped this interpretation: "Der Altar war von
Eudemos der Freundschaft errichtet; mehr als dies ein Wort brauchte ijicht
auf ihm zu stehen. Gemeint war die Freundschaft Platons; das schliesst
Aristoteles in einem zweiten Genetiv an . . ."^^
Moreover, there is a passage in the Magna Moralia which, if it
represents Aristotle's own position (as it probably does), raises the
fundamental question whether friendship with a deified Plato would even be
possible according to Aristotle: "First, then, we must determine what kind
of friendship we are in search of. For there is, people think, a friendship
towards god and towards things without life, but here they are wrong. For
friendship, we maintain, exists only where there can be a return of affection,
but friendship towards god does not admit of love being returned, nor at all
of loving. For it would be strange if one were to say that he loved Zeus."^^
The fact remains, nor is it my intention to deny it, that Plato enjoys a very
^ W. Haase ap. Gaiser 96 n. 39 adduced this passage.
21 Wil.2 561 n. 4 (on p. 562).
22 1208b26-31 (ir. S. G. Stock). I do not wish to press this passage too much, not
only because (1) it occurs in the Magn. Mor. and (2) because we cannot know whether
Aristotle's formal doctrines are to be imposed upon this poem (cf. above, note 17), but
also (3) because the date of composition of the poem is unknown, and Aristotle's beliefs
could, and did, change.
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special, indeed unique, position in these verses; we could describe him not
unfairly as a Geicx; avrip.
Next we must consider the meaning of verse 3, for it may be that no
one has understood the Greek quite correctly. There seems no disagreement
as to its rendering: "... for the man, whom it is permissible for the
wicked not even to praise." What, precisely, is the reference? Wilamowitz:
"... so war [Platon] ein Gott, und es war eine Blasphemie, wenn ein
schlechter Mensch selbst lobend von ihm redete. Dies sagt Aristoteles von
ihm aus: aber die notwendige Folge daraus, dass er ihn fur einen Gott
erklart, will man nicht ertragen?"^ Jaeger: "The name of 'friend' in Plato's
sense could be claimed only by the good. If we remember that, we shall feel
it no accident that Plato is characterized in this context as 'the man whom
bad men have no right even to praise.' The words are no mere rhetorical
hyperbole, they have reference to actualities. They are directed against a
eulogy of Plato, which was of no account, against the sharp tongues of
fellow-pupils who reproached Aristotle with unworthiness of Plato's
friendship because he had criticized certain doctrines of the master. "^^ And
again: "... the 'bad men' whose praise Aristotle thinks damaging to the
master are not just any misera plebs, but those mistaken admirers who
thought it their duty to defend Plato against Aristotle's criticism of his
doctrine."^ Earlier Gomperz and Immisch had thought that the reference
might be to such Cynic or Cyrenaic philosophers as Diogenes, Aristippus
and Antisthenes. Gaiser proposes the tyrant Dionysius the Younger or
Callippus, the Academic philosopher who killed Dion.^^ We may say at
once that the notion that Aristotle would describe Academic philosophers as
KttKoi is incredible. That he would so describe any philosopher, qua
philosopher, is most doubtful. Gaiser's suggestion in and of itself may
seem a bit more plausible, for such a characterisation of either Dionysius or
Dion would be founded on a moral, not a philosophical, judgment. The
difficulty here is that we do not know that Aristotle would have so described
them and, as Gaiser himself points out (103 n. 68), in Rhet. 1373al8-20
Aristotle treats Callippus without hostility, going so far as to say of Dion's
murder, tcc xoiavxa eyyvx; xot) |j.ti d5iKeiv cpaivexai! More importantly,
Gaiser's identification is closely connected with his general interpretation of
the poem, which assumes that both Eudemus the Cyprian and Plato were
still alive at the time of composition and this, as we have seen, cannot be.
What all these proposals have in common is the assumption that some
KaKoi, whoever they may be, actually do praise Plato and that Aristotle is
condemning them for so doing (ov) 0e|j,i(;).^^ These wicked men, we are to
23 Wil.' 416.
2* Jaeger^ 15 = 341.
"Jaeger^ 106-07.
2<* Gaiser 101.
^ Bemays, who believed that the reference was to Socrates, took verse 3 to mean that
wicked men could not praise him without thereby condemning themselves as
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understand, have lauded Plato and thereby have been guilty of blasphemy.
See especially Jaeger's explicit comments. On this interpretation, currently
orthodox, we have the rather curious (though not impossible) situation that
Aristotle is reproaching people for speaking well of Plato.
I call attention to several details. First, in this poem aiveiv perhaps
does not mean "praise" at all. The primary meaning of this non-Attic verb
is not "praise," but "tell" or "speak of (see LSJ s.v.), and the most natural,
and expected, thought in such a context is, "in honor of a man whom it is
right for the wicked not even to mention."^^ Compare Aesch. Agam. 97-
98, o Ti Kal 5\)vax6v Kal Ge^iiq, aivei.^' What is more, it is a curious
fact that, if (it is a large "if") Aristotle is employing his formal
philosophical vocabulary in this poem, it would, strictly speaking, be
inappropriate for anyone to make Plato the object of aiveiv in the sense of
"praise" (i.e. = EJiaiveiv). For, while, pace Wilamowitz, Aristotle does not
look upon Plato as a god in this poem, he clearly looks upon him as
godlike, as Qeioc,, and it is a tenet of Aristotle's that such people, like gods,
are not the proper recipients of praise at all. They are above it.^^
"Ungliickselige," because they would thus be acknowledging the truth of the doctrine set
forth in verse 6 that only the good man is simultaneously "glijcklich"—and they
themselves are not good (Rh. Mas. 33 [1878] 232-33). We need not linger over this
curiosity, which seems to assume that the allegedly "wicked" men would have the same
opinion of themselves as Aristotle had of them. Surely they would not.
^ This and similar expressions are widespread; compare a tomb marker in Tama, Iowa,
U.S.A.:
Assassinated
July 19, 1913
By a dirty coward
Whose name is not worthy
to be mentioned here.
(Quoted in Sudden & Awful: American Epitaphs and the Finger of God, by T. C. Mann and
J. Greene [Brattleboro. VT 1968] 53.)
^' al'vei Wieseler: aiveiv MV, a corruption which shows how naturally aiveiv can
follow Genii; (and here the verb cannot mean "praise"; note also that there is another
variant, namely eineiv).
In his formal philosophy Aristotle uses eJtaivo<; and enaiveiv in a technical sense.
EN llOlblO ff.: eniaKe\|/cofie6a nepl tfiq evSainovioq noxepa xoiv enaivexcov eoxlv t)
fiaXXov xoiv xifiiojv (i.e. does Happiness possess relative or absolute value?). The
distinction between xa enaivexd and xa xifiia is that the fomier is relative, not absolute;
it is applied with reference to a discrete standard (8i ' avacpopaq). For this reason Aristotle
regards praise of the gods as ridiculous (YeXoioq); he states explicitly xoiv dpioxcov owk
eaxiv eTiaivoc;, aXKa nei^ov xi Kai PeXxiov . . . xoitz, xe ydp Geovq ^laKapi^onev
Kal eiL)5aijiov{^onev Kal xcov dvSptov xoi)c SeioxdxoDq (1 101b22-24'). Compare
further MM 1183bl9-27; EE 1219bll-16. As M. Nussbaum succinctly observes at MA
700b34: "Geioxepov Kal ximcixepov. These words are Linked elsewhere, and contrasted
with enaivexov: the xijiiov and the divine are above praise; the object of praise is praised
because it stands in a certain relation to something else." If, I say, Aristotle intended a
strict distinction here, there can be no doubt that Plato is to be ranked among the objects
of xijifi, not of enaivoq. If such be the case, the meaning of aiveiv is settled.
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Next, I list some expressions, the relevance of which will soon become
apparent: (1) Lysias, fr. 53. 1 Thalheim = Athcn. 12. 555 e-f ox>x oxtxoc,
EOTiv 6 toiavxa nepl Geoxx; e^aiiaptdvcov, a xoi^ ^ev aXkoic, aioxpov
eoxi Kttl Xeyew kxX.; (2) Isocr. 4. 92 o\) yap 6ti tovto ye GejXK; EiTietv;
(3) Dem. 18. 128 tiou . . . nai6eia<; aoi Be^iq p.vTio0fivai; (= ou Ge^iiq
aoi . . . ; compare the context); (4) PI. Tim. 29a ei 6e o ^ti5' eijieiv xivi
Ge^iiq KxX.; (5) [PL] £p//i. 986b . . . o'l 6e xoiovxoi xiveq oiovq o\)6e Ge^vq
EiTieiv r[\iG>v o\)6evi; (6) Plut. Mor. 1076b ei yovv, o ^-qSe Gep.i<; eaxlv
EiTieiv, KxX. These passages show how common verbs of mentioning are
with OX) Ge)ii<; and comparable phrases. While this evidence does not prove
that such is the meaning of aivEiv here, it lends support to such an
interpretation. Se^k;, as well as o\) Geiik; (fas/nefas) is common in such
expressions, PI. Phdr. 250b £XE>.ot)vxo xcav xeIexcov t^v Geiik; A.eyeiv
^laKapKoxdxTiv; Soph. 258b ei Ge^ik; eitieiv; Symp. 195a ev Ge^i^ Kal
dvE|X£OTixov EiKEiv. Naturally, where the context calls for it, other
infinitives also occur, e.g. Eur. Hipp. 1396 Kax' ooocov 5' ov Qi^ic,
PaA.Eiv 6dKp\); PI. Apol. 30c-d oij ydp oio^ai Gejiixov Eivai djiEivovi
dv6pl vnb xzipovoc, P^dirxEoGai; Theocr. 1. 15-16 o-u Ge^ik; d|i)iiv
0'opia5Ev; [Dem.] 25. 81 xo-uxcov y' o\jG' oaiov o-uxe Gejik; xw ^iiapw
xot)xcp ^Exa5ot)vai.^^ In any event, the basic interpretation of the poem is
not dependent upon the specific meaning of aivEiv here, since either
"mention" or "praise" makes sense.
On the other hand, what is crucial for an understanding of our passage is
the recognition that o\) G£|j.iq with an infinitive of saying or mentioning (or
praising) does not necessarily imply that anyone has actually mentioned the
person or carried out the practice in question. In this regard ov Geiik; with
any infinitive is at least neutral; the speaker who uses ov Geiik; is
expressing a moral judgment on an activity which may or may not have
actually occurred. Very often the context shows that it did not and cannot.
This is particularly clear at PI Apol. 20b, where Apollo, 6 Geoc; 6 ev
AeX,(poi<;, is the subject: xi o\)v tioxe Xiyei [sc. b Ge6<;] (pdoKcov eiie
oo(pcoxaxov Eivai; ov) ydp 5ti7io\) \|/Et>SExai yE- ot) ydp Gejik; a\)xa) .
Inspection of the contexts of the other examples of ov Ge^k; cited above will
provide further confirmation of this.
In other words, contrary to the widespread assumptions of previous
interpreters, in the clause ov oil)5' aivEiv xoioi KaKoiai Geiik;, the dative
xoiai KttKoiai need not, and, I would say, certainly does not contain an
allusion to any definite individuals. The clause is generic and there is no
reason to assume that Aristotle has any specific person(s) in mind. Gaiser
observed, "Dass der aristotelische Vers zum Teil formelhaften Charakter hat,
beweist der Anklang an einen Vers des Euripides (Hippolytos 81), wo es den
^' For more examples of oii 6eniq c. inf. and a discussion of the meaning of oij Befiii;
see A. W. BuUoch. Callimachus. The Fifth Hymn (Cambridge 1985) 185-86 (note to verse
78).
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Schlechten verwehrt wird (xolc, KaKoiai 6' ov Gejo-ii;), die Blumen der Gottin
zu pflucken."^^ This is a useful observation, even if Aristotle's words are
hardly a "reminiscence" of the Hippolytus passage. What that passage rather
suggests is that ot) Se^k; xoiq KaKoic; cum infinitivo was a stock religious
expression. In the nature of things we would expect it to be so, and
Aristotle's verse further suggests this. One should notice immediately that
in Euripides, as in Aristotle, the dative xolc, KaKoi(; is most naturally
understood as generic. I call attention to another passage, "Hippocrates" Lex
c. 5: Toc 5e lepa eovxa TtpTjYjxaxa lepoiaiv dvGpcoTioioi SeiKvuxai-
PePt|Xoioi 5e ot) Ge^k;, Tiplv ii xeXeaGcooiv opyCoiaiv inioxT\[n]<;. Note the
striking parallelism with Aristotle here. There is the same transference of
mystery terminology to intellectual revelation (6eiicv\)Tai/KaTe5ei4ev),
and the same expression of religious prohibition (PePriXoiai ov Ge|j.i<;/Toiai
KaKotai OIL) Ge|j.i<;), Above all, observe that the dative PePrjA^oioi is
unquestionably generic; no specific individual is, or can be, intended. This
argues strongly that the article in xoiai KaKoiai is generic and that both
expressions should be interpreted along similarly general lines.
Let us return to Euripides' Hippolytus, verses 78-81, to which
reference has just been made above:
Ai5d)q 5e Jioxanioiai ktitievei 6p6aoi(;,
oook; 5i5aKx6v ^.tiSev aXX' ev xfi <p\)oei
x6 aoxppoveiv tiXr\xty tic, xct navx* oei,
xovxoiq 5p£jieo9ai, xoiq Kaxoiai 5' ov Qi\iic,.
Hippolytus is the speaker, and his gospel is, in its own way, as strange for
the fifth century as Plato's was for the fourth. Who are the KaKoi whojn he
has in mind? W. S. Barrett ad loc. observes the following: "Eur. is not
concerned to pass allusive judgement on any particular beliefs of his own
day: his theme is not contemporary but timeless, and his purpose is simply
to dehneate in its beauty and inadequacy alike the puritan austerity of which
Hipp, is the type. . . . this picture ... is no piece of contemporary
polemic but a dramatist's characterization of a type . . ." (p. 173). This is,
mutatis mutandis, as good an exegesis as any of Aristotle's ov o\)5' aiveiv
Toiai KaKoiai Ge^ik;.
Now verse 7, ov vvv 5' egxi A^aPEiv otjSevI xavxd tioxe: What does
this mean? Not a few, including Wilamowitz, pronounced it corrupt. None
of the numerous conjectures proposed carries conviction; in such a situation
it is always prudent to return to the paradosis and attempt to extract sense
from it. The verse has been approached from several directions. Rose's
conjecture, AxxGeTv ot)5£va for XaPfitv oil)5evI (= "No one can now fail to
notice this"), cannot be correct, because it goes too far. Aristotle would not
say that Plato's holy revelation was now obvious to everyone; only certain
philosophers could hope to grasp it. The same objection applies to
'^Gaiser 101 (after H. Hommel: n. 60).
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Theiler's xaux' anopov for Tav»Ta noxe. Gaiser, retaining the MS text,
understands vvv to mean "in this world," "in the here and now," in contrast
to the incorporeal other world of the disembodied soul, so that for him the
verse means: In this world of matter no one can grasp (XaPew) the know-
ledge of ultimate reality; only in another existence can one truly acquire
(XaPeiv) the ideal knowledge of Platonic philosophy. He goes so far as to
see an allusion to anamnesis in the poem. The meaning which he gives lo
vt)v here is, in this context and without further qualification, impossible,
and his whole interpretation is, in my judgment, quite mistaken. To go no
further, it was in the here and now that Plato showed clearly by his hfe (= 6
v\)v pioq!) the truth expressed in the sixth verse. Jaeger also defended the
paradosis and explained ovk eaxi XaPeiv as a "standing expression in
Aristotle's treatises for the unattainability of the ideal." (Against this
interpretation of the Greek see Gaiser 91.) Jaeger renders the verse, "But
now it is not possible for anyone ever to attain this." By "this" (xama) he
understands what everyone else seems to, namely the philosophical "gospel"
announced in the sixth verse. The objection to Jaeger's interpretation is the
opposite of that to Rose's and Theiler's: It does not go far enough. By
denying the possibility of anyone else's attaining this ideal,^^ Jaeger would
have Aristotle deny the possibility of the philosophical life in a most un-
Platonic, and un-Aristotelian, manner. Here it is relevant to recall the
metaphor KaxeSei^ev, which it was Jaeger's own merit to have elucidated.
It is an image drawn from the sphere of religious revelation. It would be
pointless, and no grounds for veneration, to have revealed the unattainable.
Rather, literal sacred mysteries (xeA^exai) are revealed to the elect, to those
capable offull initiation into them. As applied to philosophers, the select
few, the analogy here is obvious and perfect.
Let us try a different approach. That the verse, beginning with ot) vvv
5' and ending with Tioxe, is inelegant seems clear. Aristotle was not a
professional poet and some of his experiments with diction do not succeed.
He has been harshly judged by distinguished critics: "... ein Dichter war
Aristoteles nicht, das zeigen alle seine Verse;"^'* "... Aristotle, whose
memory for poetry was as lamentable as his talent for composing it."^^
Others, including Guthrie^^ and Jaeger, have been kinder; in GRBS 23
(1982) 251-74 I have tried to show that Aristotle's Hermias poem was a
technically sophisticated production. But rough edges there undoubtedly are.
In verse 4 jiovoq t\ npGnoq is prosaic; the collocation is partly borrowed
from Aristotle's own technical rhetorical diction. See Rhet. 1368alO,
1375a2, 1385a21 (noted by Gaiser, after K. Thraede: 96 n. 42). In verse 7
'3 Jaeger^ 17 = 344: "The doctrine is not the less true for the fact that only Plato
himself was able whoUy lo realize it."
^ Wil.^ 561 n. 4 (on p. 562).
^5 M. L. West, Hesiod. Theogony (Oxford 1966) 68.
'<* W. K. C. Guthrie. History of Greek Philosophy VI (Cambridge 1981) 33 (on the
Hermias poem).
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ox> vOv . , . ot)5Evl . . . noxe should be taken closely together: "But not
now is it ever possible for anyone . . ."^^ The general meaning would be
more clearly represented by v\)v 5* o{)KeTi eoxi kxX. Aristotle seems to
have attempted a stronger denial by using ovnoxe (i.e. "never again now")
rather than ouketi, and by placing o\> at the beginning and tcote at the end
of the verse, somewhat infelicitously. Wilamowitz's vOv 5' ov)k eaxi
(Hermes 65 [1930] 246) seems to me a rewriting of Aristotle rather than a
correction of the MSS,
If the reader is prepared to follow thus far, namely to accept (1) that the
text is sound and (2) that Aristotle is stating, somewhat cumbersomely, that
it is not now—and never will be
—
possible for any to attain this (ka^eiv
tauxa), to what, then, does Tat>Ta refer? We have seen that scholars
understand it of the content of the sixth verse and that the resultant sense is
problematic. Greek often uses plural demonstratives where we expect a
singular. May not Tat)Ta refer rather to Plato's achievement as expressed
in verses 4 and 5, namely )x6vo<; fj npGnoq Bvtitcov KaTe5ei^£v evapycoc;
KxX.l Aristotle glorifies Plato as the npSnoc, eupexric; of this philosophical
truth, much as Lucretius has glorified Epicurus, especially in the proems to
his third and fifth books. Plato it was who first revealed, by his life and
teaching, this great mystery, that a man becomes good and happy
simultaneously. To have revealed that—this is the distinction which no one
else can ever attain, the prize which no one can now win (XaPeiv can mean
either or both).^* The glory is all Plato's and his alone.
University of California, Santa Barbara
^^ Compare Jaeger^ 17 = 344: "vuv and Ttoxe do not exclude one another, as has been
thought, viiv includes all time since Plato; Ttoxe stands for any moment of time within
this period . . . Attempts to alter the words o\) vuv are due to a failure to see that the
sharp opposition is needed to distinguish the present of the writer from the time when
Plato still moved among men."
^* Aa^l^dvo) in the sense of "winning" a prize is common; see LSJ .y.v. dGXcv I. It is
curious, and perhaps no mere coincidence, that the phrases jiovoq Kai Jtptoroc; and npSytoc,
Ktti (lovoi; are technical terms of the vocabulary of athletic competition. See M. N. Tod,
"Greek Record -Keeping and Record-Breaking," CQ 43 (1949) 111: "But by far the
commonest phrase is the combination fiovoq Kai npSrzoc, or Ttpcotoc; Kal \i6voc,, used
interchangeably . . ." For occurrences in non-athletic contexts, see e.g. PI. Menex. 237e
(ji. Ktti 7t.) and Polyb. 4. 20. 3 {n. Kal p..).

